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)

NO. 43952
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-8846
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Taylor Benedict appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when
it refused to reduce his sentence pursuant to his oral motion at a probation disposition
proceeding for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). The State’s arguments
in response fail to appreciate the nature of Mr. Benedict’s motion and his argument on
appeal. As a result, its arguments run contrary to Idaho Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals precedent, as well as the district court’s findings of fact. Therefore, the State’s
arguments are unfounded and should be rejected.

Accordingly, this Court should

reduce Mr. Benedict’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand this
case to the district court for a new disposition determination.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Benedict’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reduce Mr. Benedict’s
sentence when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Reduce Mr. Benedict’s
Sentence When It Revoked His Probation And Executed His Underlying Sentence
A.

The Information About Mr. Benedict’s Performance On Probation Constitutes
New Information Supporting His Oral Rule 35 Motion At The Probation
Revocation Hearing
The State’s assertion that Mr. Benedict did not support his oral Rule 35 motion

with new or additional evidence (see Resp. Br., p.3) represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of Mr. Benedict’s motion, the relevant Idaho Supreme Court
precedent, and the district court’s conclusion of facts as to Mr. Benedict’s performance
on probation. Mr. Benedict made his Rule 35 motion as part of his recommendations
for disposition on the probation violations he had admitted. (See Tr., p.10, L.22 - p.12,
L.5.) “Upon revocation of that probation, the court . . . could either impose the sentence
that had previously been suspended or reduce that sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Idaho Criminal Rules.” See State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). The decision
of whether to reduce a sentence when revoking probation must necessarily turn on the
information available to the district court at the disposition hearing, i.e., the defendant’s
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performance on probation. Furthermore, since defendants cannot argue the district
court should have exercised that authority for the first time on appeal, State v. Clontz,
156 Idaho 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014), defendant’s need to ask the district court to
exercise that authority at the disposition hearing.
Mr. Benedict did precisely that. Specifically, defense counsel argued, “he did
start out very well. I know that he was working, and he was going to meetings at the
Grapevine. And it also seemed to be going very well.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18.) However,
his performance deteriorated, as defense counsel explained, “I’m simply speculating
here, but my suspicion is that he ran into some old cohorts, an old crowd that he
probably knew better than to be around and got himself in trouble. Again, I think he’s
coming before this court fully acknowledging that.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.19-24.) “As a result,
Your Honor, I would ask this court to consider a Rule 35 . . . to give him some relief on
the fixed time.” (Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.5.) Thus, the new information, which the
district court did not have when it imposed the sentence, was Mr. Benedict’s initial
performance on probation. The State’s argument that there was no new evidence runs
directly counter to the rule the Supreme Court articulated in Timbana, and so, should be
rejected.
Furthermore, the State’s contention that Mr. Benedict’s performance on probation
does not constitute new information ignores the district court’s factual findings about
Mr. Benedict’s performance on probation.

(Resp. Br., p.3.)

Evidence about the

defendant’s rehabilitative progress has been held to constitute new information which
the district court can consider in regard to a Rule 35 motion.

See, e.g., State v.

Simmons, 116 Idaho 69, 76 (Ct. App. 1989). This is because “[i]t would ill serve the
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purpose of a Rule 35 motion to preclude the defendant from presenting fresh
information about himself or his circumstances.” State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898
(Ct. App. 1984).
The district court found, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Benedict entered probation
with several issues to address, but found “one by one, you have been putting those
[issues] aside.”

(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-22.)

The district court concluded this constituted

positive performance on probation, as it told Mr. Benedict, “I’m really proud of how well
you did. I really am.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-17.) Regardless of whether the State views
Mr. Benedict’s performance on probation in the same way as the district court (see
Resp. Br., pp.3-5), the district court’s conclusions of fact are entitled deference unless
they are shown to be clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 443
(2015). The State has not argued those findings are clearly erroneous. (See generally
Resp. Br.)

It could not have done so either.

There is substantial and competent

evidence supporting the district court’s finding. (R., pp.144-47 (minutes from several
status conferences during which Mr. Benedict’s progress with his treatment and job
search were discussed).)

As such, there is new information about Mr. Benedict’s

progress on probation which supports his Rule 35 motion.
B.

The State’s Argument On The Merits Of Mr. Benedict’s Motion Runs Contrary To
Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The State acknowledges, as Mr. Benedict did, that the district court did not

articulate its reasons for revoking Mr. Benedict’s probation or implicitly denying his Rule
35 motion. (Resp. Br., p.4; App. Br., p.5 n.3.) In such cases, the Idaho Supreme Court
has held, “‘although the trial court failed to make specific statements regarding its
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reasons for imposing the sentence, a review of the record adequately reflects his
reasoning.’” State v. Newman, 124 Idaho 415, 418 (1993) (quoting State v. Osborn,
104 Idaho 809, 810 (1983)). Despite the Idaho Supreme Court’s determination that
such cases require drawing reasonable inferences from the record, the State believes it
is possible for application of that rule to be black and white, that an interpretation of the
district court’s actions can be “patently false.” (Resp. Br., p.3.) The State is mistaken.
The rule adopted in Newman and Osborn necessarily includes some gray area, as the
parties and court on appeal are asked to attempt to divine the district court’s unspoken
rationale from its statements and decisions. In such cases, there is no black-and-white
answer.
Furthermore, if the record could unequivocally reveal the district court’s rationale,
as the State believes, the appellate courts would not have to continue to reiterate the
point that, though it is not required, it is “welcomed and encouraged” for sentencing
courts to articulate the reasons for their sentencing decisions. State v. King, 120 Idaho
955, 958 (Ct. App. 1991); see, e.g., State v. Follinus, 124 Idaho 26, 30 (1993) (same);
State v. Brewer, 106 Idaho 145, 146 (1984) (same); Osborn, 104 Idaho at 810 (same);
State v. Smith, 127 Idaho 632, 633 (Ct. App. 1995) (same); see also State v. Moreno,
2015 WL 1237301, *1 (Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished) (same).1 Therefore, the State’s
over-simplistic evaluation of the merits of Mr. Benedict’s Rule 35 motion should be
rejected.

Moreno is simply cited as a historical example of the courts’ continued reference to
this principle, not for any precedent binding on this court. See Staff of Idaho Real
Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (explaining “consideration of the
unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example, was appropriate”);
accord. Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991) (same).
1

5

At any rate, the inferences Mr. Benedict drew from the district court’s statements
and actions are not unreasonable. He specifically asked for a reduction of the fixed
term of his sentence based on the strides he made before violating his probation.
(Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.5.) The association between the term of the fixed sentence and
parole eligibility is obvious from statute: “During a minimum term of confinement, the
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge. . . .” I.C. § 19-2513. The district
court acknowledged the strides Mr. Benedict made on probation. (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-22;
see R., pp.144-47.) However, it decided to revoke his probation in response to his
admission to violating the terms of that probation. (Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.3.) It stated,
“I’m going to impose the seven-year sentence, consisting of three years fixed, followed
by four years indeterminate. You have credit for quite a bit of time served, well over a
year and a half.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-8.) From those statements, Mr. Benedict reasonably
inferred the unspoken reason the district court executed his sentence with three years
fixed (i.e., without reducing the fixed term of his sentence) despite his initial positive
performance on probation was because he had “well over a year and a half” of credit
accrued. (App. Br., pp.4-7.)
Mr. Benedict does not, however, contend this is the only reasonable way to
interpret the district court’s unspoken decision to deny his Rule 35 motion because, as
noted supra, there is gray area in this regard. The State, for example, contends that the
district court’s decision might be understood as a product of evaluating Mr. Benedict’s
potential risk to the community.

(See Resp. Br., p.4.)

Although that might be a

reasonable inference, Mr. Benedict contends his is the more reasonable inference
because, unlike his inference, the State’s inference does not account for the district
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court’s recognition of the positive aspects of Mr. Benedict’s performance on probation.
(See generally Resp. Br.)
The district court expressly acknowledged that Mr. Benedict had been reducing
his risk to the community by addressing aspects of his character and situation which
had previously increased his risk to recidivate: “[Y]our risk to recidivate, your numbers
are so high that the deck has been stacked against you. And one by one, you have
been putting those cards aside.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.) That conclusion by the district
court runs directly counter to the heart of the State’s inference – that the decision was
reasonable because Mr. Benedict posed an unacceptable risk to society. Therefore, the
State’s inference is much less reasonable than Mr. Benedict’s.
As such, this Court should adopt Mr. Benedict’s more-reasonable inference
about the district court’s decision in regard to his Rule 35 motion.

In that regard,

Mr. Benedict continues to assert the district court abused its discretion when it refused
to reduce his sentence when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying
sentence for the reasons detailed on pages 4-7 of his Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Benedict respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 15th day of July, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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